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LAWYER CREEDS AND MORAL SEISMOGRAPHY 
James E. Moliterno * 
Unquestionably, "popular respect for the legal profession is 
steadily falling"; there is "much cause for discouragement and some 
cause for alarm. "1 "[L]awyers ... are blamed for some serious public 
problems," including the enormous costs of increased litigation.2 
"Year by year the various law schools send increasing armies of new 
recruits, far beyond the requirements of even this litigious commu-
nity."3 Lawyers act with "exaggerated contentious[ness],»4 as if they 
were "gladiator[s]" in a war, making every effort to "wipe out the 
other side."5 Among the causes of this crisis is the attitude that the 
law is no longer a profession, but a mere competitive business in 
which its members face increased "economic pressure[s]."6 Better 
legal education may not even help because "[t]he evil ... is not so 
much a professional as an American fault. It has its source in our 
inordinate love for the almighty dollar."7 
Without the footnotes, it takes some care to distinguish the pre-
vious paragraph's turn of the twentieth century quotations from its 
turn of the twenty-first century quotations.8 Remember, 
* James E. Molitemo is Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Skills 
Program at the College of William & Mary. The production of this article was 
supported by a William & Mary Law School summer research grant; consider-
able excellent research assistance was provided by Pamela Kultgen, Jon Nixon, 
David Spooner, and Catherine Trinkle. 
1. MORRIS GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 11-12 (1931). 
2. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, ~ .. In the Spirit of Public Service:' A 
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 253 
(1986) [hereinafter Blueprint]. 
3. 10 THE LAW STUDENT'S HELPER 35 (Sprague 1902) (on file with the 
author). 
4. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admini-
stration of Justice, reprinted in 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 406 (1906). 
5. Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does "Hardball" Litigation Pro-
duce the Best Result for Your Client?, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 24, 26 (quoting 
a local bar president). 
6. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 261. 
7. Proceedings of the Association of American Law Schools 11 (1906) 
[hereinafter 1906 AALS Proceedings]. 
8. Facts are always perceived within the context of their times; today's 
perceived problems are not always tomorrow's. For example, in 1959, an ABA 
Special Committee on the Economics of Law Practice concluded that the major 
problem facing the profession was that too few people were entering the law 
schools. 
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"[d]issatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as the 
law," raising issues of professional decline with some regularity.9 
Some incivility among lawyers has always existed and inevita-
bly always will. The lawyer's role in the adversarial system by its 
nature puts the lawyer in the midst of strongly partisan and some-
times emotionally charged activity. Human nature dictates that no 
matter how honorable a lawyer might be, some combative conduct 
will occasionally occur.:10 Once again, however, as a moral shift is 
occurring in the American legal profession and the society within 
which it exists, the profession is wringing its hands hoping to find a 
solution to this "problem." A major piece of the profession's solution 
to the current crisis has been the adoption of professionalism 
creeds. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professionalism creeds are sweeping the nation. At a time 
when Rule 11 sanctions abound, when the definition of "hardball 
litigation" is debated, and when the bar conducts seminars on 
dealing with the S.O.B. lawyer, bar associations across the nation 
are racing to adopt good manners oaths.11 But are these develop-
ments solely the result of a decaying moral fabric among lawyers? 
Might there also be an inherent, cause and effect relationship be-
tween changes in the nature, format and tone of the American Bar 
Association's (ABA) model ethics pronouncements and the rise of 
the voluntary, aspirational creeds? What will happen if, as has 
been indicated in recent decisions, courts or bar association disci-
plinary committees begin to enforce these voluntary, aspirational 
creeds?12 And, whether enforceable or not, upon what should these 
creeds be based? 
The practice and the bar have changed dramatically, in some 
ways undoubtedly for the worse, but in other ways for the better, 
since the days of David Hoffman's aspirational resolutions, 13 elitist 
9. Pound, supra note 4, at 395. 
10. See Susan Davis, Burnout, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1994, at 48 (reporting the 
nature of stress and burnout that are implicit in the legal profession); Warren 
E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62 ("We Americans are 
a competitive people and that spirit has brought us to near greatness. But that 
competitive spirit gives rise to conflicts and tensions."); Milo Geyelin, Court-
room Rudeness Has Americans Pining for Civil Litigation, WAI.:L ST. J. EUR., 
July 9, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL-WSJE 2026228 (suggesting that the 
adversarial system is incompatible with civility). 
11. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989). 
For a discussion of the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism, 
see infra notes 126-40 and accompanying text. 
12. For a discussion of recent court decisions enforcing creeds, see infra 
Part II. 
13. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (Arno Press 1972) 
(1836). 
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bar admission policies,14 and client and self-interested drafting and 
adoption of legal ethics rules.15 Indeed, among the first impeti to 
have bar associations was the fear that the children of southern and 
eastern European immigrants and other undesirables were going to 
infiltrate the club.16 The organized bar, happily, can no longer rely 
on the homogeneity of its membership and its membership's virtu-
ally common, elitist upbringing to ensure maintenance of its defini-
tion of civility among the group's members. To the extent the new 
creeds are merely a hoped-for return to the moral force of formerly 
common values in the membership's actions toward each other, to-
ward the court, and toward its clients, the creeds are bound to fail 
and to retard the progress toward pluralism of the profession in the 
process. 
The reality is that lawyers in the golden age17 were not civil to 
fellow lawyers who were outside of their own socioeconomic group 
and practice orientation. To the extent that lawyers were more civil 
in the golden age than they are today, that former civility only ex-
isted within a commonly interested group oflawyers who had essen-
tially agreed not to compete with one another for clients,18 and who 
together formed a profession-ruling class that recognized the en-
emy, to whom they were anything but civil, as all lawyers who 
looked or spoke or thought differently from them. Not coinciden-
tally, at some of these historical junctures, the outsider's clients 
were largely people who had claims against the clients of the profes-
sion's ruling class.19 Civility has, at various times in the history of 
the American legal profession, been what members of particular 
practice cohorts gave to one another, but not to those members of 
the profession who were outside the cohort. During such times, out-
siders of one description or another have been the object of uncivil 
conduct by the most well-established members of the profession.20 
The perceived need by both the public and the profession21 for 
enhanced ethics in the legal profession is the basis for acceptance by 
14. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 94-101. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. at 107-09. For a discussion of bar associations' history of dis-
crimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnicity, class, and family back-
ground, see infra Part III.B. 
17. A "golden age" is a moving target, probably corresponding to the fifty 
years preceding the professional memory of those currently in the practice, es-
timated today to be from roughly 1900 to 1950. 
18. See HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 5, 190-191 (Greenwood Press 
1980) (1953); GEORGE W. W ARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS § 324, at 205-06 
(1902). 
19. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 44-48. 
20. See id. 
21. For an analysis of the differences between the public's view and the 
profession's view of the current problems, see Deborah Rhode, Lawyers: The 
Public's View and the Profession's View, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
1997). 
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both lawyers and non-lawyers of a need for professionalism creeds. 
What is far less clear is whether a return to the civility of the past 
actually represents the higher ethical standard that its proponents 
would have the profession and public believe it to be.22 
Lawyers, as well as the public, recognize the need for more in-
tegrity and civility in the legal profession. Some lawyers blame the 
decline in lawyer civility on incessant hardball among lawyers.23 
Hardball, according to Chicago lawyer Philip Corboy, "is when a 
lawyer, whether plaintiff's or defense, is personally antagonistic or 
insistent on all of the procedural rules being followed."24 Defining 
"antagonistic or insistent," however, is not easy. Given a lawyer's 
unquestioned ducy to his or her client, characterizing "insistence" as 
a negative attribute is hardly a proposition that is universally ac-
cepted.25 
The hardball approach, some assert, arises from the transition 
in the minds of many lawyers that lawyering is now as much a 
business as a profession. A bottom-line mentality of "win-at-any-
cost" often exacerbates tensions in lawyer relationships.26 But this 
so-called mind-set change is not of recent origin. Rather, it has ac-
companied times of prior professionalism crises.27 
The profession may, in fact, need lawyer creeds to fill an aspira-
tional niche. According to a survey commissioned by the ABA, pub-
lic perception of lawyers is relatively unfavorable.28 The survey 
suggested, for instance, "a disturbing pattern that the more a per-
son knows about the legal profession and the more he or she is in 
direct personal contact with lawyers, the lower an individual's 
opinion of them."29 When asked to volunteer in their own words 
22. See Burger, supra note 10, at 62; Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251. 
23. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1987, at 
48, 51. 
24. Id. at 48; see also Daniel J. Lehmann, Church Plays Legal Hardball, 
Cm. SUN TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 14 (describing Catholic Church litigation tac-
tics); Carole Bass, Playing Litigation Hardball, CoNN. L. TruB., Jan. 2, 1995, at 
1 (describing US Surgical's 200 hour deposition of opposing party); Randall 
Samborn, Priest Playing Hardball to Battle Abuse Charges, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 
1994, at A1 (discussing priest's litigation tactics in sex abuse case); Stanley S. 
Arkin, Blackmail and the Practice of Law, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 7, 1995, at 3 
(discussing use of blackmail as a legal tactic); MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF 
ON UNFAIR TACTICS (2d ed. 1988) (discussing tactics for playing hardball in law-
suits). 
25. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 23, at 52; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETmCS 6-10 (1990); ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 182-84 (2d ed. 1955). 
26. Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics 
Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 654 n.89 (1990). 
27. See id. at 639-42 (discussing the author's experiences with aggressive 
lawyers as a practicing attorney from 1948 through 1964, and from 1977 
through 1979); 1906AALS Porceedings, supra note 7, at 10-11. 
28. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 60-61. 
29. Id. at 62. 
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changes that should be made in the legal profession, the largest 
segment of respondents-twenty-two percent-suggested improve-
ments in ethics, integrity, and accountability.30 These responses 
suggest that lawyer creeds would be supported by the public, and 
that the profession would benefit by articulating properly framed 
and based aspirations and then fulfilling them. But again, history 
reminds us that the public has before blamed increases in litigious-
ness on lawyers rather than on the cultural and societal changes 
that have largely spawned the grounds for the litigation increase.31 
The current wave of creeds may be little more than a natural 
outgrowth of the change in tone of the ABA model ethics pro-
nouncements.32 The change of ABA model ethics pronouncements 
and their adoption by the states over the twentieth century have 
made the rise of the modern creeds all but inevitable. The new 
creeds are, however, inappropriate and unwise bases for discipli-
nary or judicial sanctions enforcement because they are valuable 
only as aspiration and because many of the current creeds are erro-
neously and dangerously based on a pragmatic, client-interest ra-
tionale and are reflective of a past era's false civility.33 If the profes-
sion will inevitably have creeds, and hopefully unenforceable ones, 
the current crop is ill conceived. They are to too great an extent a 
harkening back to a happily-lost moral basis for the profession that, 
if it ever was, is no longer dominant. To create a creed that would 
be useful beyond its public relations effects, a new, more inclusive, 
less elitist, moral basis must be found for the profession that can 
serve as the creed's foundation.34 
I. A HISTORY OF CODES AND CREEDS 
A Colonial and Pre-Colonial Lawyer Ethics Pronouncements 
As early as the fourteenth century, lawyers were being held to a 
high ethical standard.35 An English statute of 1403 mandated that 
attorneys admitted to the bar be "virtuous, learned, and sworn to do 
their duty."36 Furthermore, these fifteenth century attorneys were 
required to take an oath pledging that they would "be good and vir-
30. See id. at 64. 
31. See CHARLES WARREN, A HisTORY OF THE .AMERICAN BAR 214-16 (William 
S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1911) (recounting the popular opinion regarding the sharp 
increase in debt collection following the American Revolution). 
32. For a discussion of the ABA's movement from aspiration to mandate in 
its ethics pronouncements, see infra Part I. C. 
33. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of creeds relying on a past era, 
see infra Part III.B. 
34. For a discussion of the creation of a new creed, see infra Part III.C. 
35. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 24. 
36. Id. at 26. 
786 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
tuous, and of good fame."37 A 1729 statute required attorneys to 
"swear, that I will truly and honestly demean myself in the practice 
of an attorney, according to the best of my knowledge and ability."38 
These early oaths were a combination of minimum, enforceable 
standards and aspiration. They were meant to set an enforceable 
standard ofbehavior but were, in part, cast in aspirationallanguage 
with a moral rather than pragmatic basis. The statutes were aimed 
at admitting only good and virtuous men who worked according to 
their best ability; the oaths aim at an ideal level of conduct and 
move on moral terms beyond what is necessary to maintain a mini-
mum acceptable level of behavior and competence.39 
This English tradition was wholly embraced by colonial legisla-
tures, which universally adopted the practice of swearing in attor-
neys.40 Colonies that adopted regulations prior to 1729 simply 
stipulated that attorneys had to be "sworn in".41 Colonies that pre-
scribed an attorney oath after 1729 adopted the English version al-
most verbatim.42 The colonies, then, thoroughly adopted the Eng-
lish tradition of adopting requirements that were a combination of 
mandatory minimum standards and aspirational promises. 
37. The Punishment of an Attorney Found in Default, 4 Hen. 4, ch. 18 
(1402) (Eng.). 
38. An Act for the Better Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors, 2 Geo. 2, 
ch. 23, § 13 (1729) (Eng.). 
39. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 43. 
40. See id. at 53 (Maryland (1674)); id. at 72-73 (Massachusetts (1686)); id. 
at 141, 218 (Rhode Island (1705)); id. at 130 (Connecticut (1708)); id. at 121 
(South Carolina (1712)); id. at 139 (New Hampshire (1714)); id. at 109 
(Pennsylvania (1726)); id. at 126 (Georgia (1731)); id. at 202 (Delaware (1741)); 
id. at 43 (Virginia (1748)); id. at 113 (New Jersey (1763)); id. at 125 (North 
Carolina (1777)); id. at 295 n.1 (New York (1777)). In Virginia and several 
other colonies, early attempts to regulate admission to the bar followed several 
periods of prohibition of lawyering for fee. I d. at 40-42. Lawyers have been re-
quired to take oaths aimed at unusual ends: Rhode Island lawyers, for example, 
were required to swear that they would accept paper money in payment of fees. 
Id. at218. 
41. See e.g., An Order for the Holding of Courts and the Execution of Jus-
tice, Mass. Stat. 1701-2, ch. 7, § 2 (photo. reprint 1976) (1686) (codified as 
amended at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 221, § 38 (West 1958)). 
42. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Practice of Attorneys, 22 Geo. 2, ch. 
47 (1748) (Va.). Virginia amended its oath in 1785 but the text remained partly 
mandatory and partly aspirational in character. An Act Regulating the Admis-
sion of Attorneys, 6 Va. Stat. 169, ch. 29 (1785). The statute stipulated that 
only those of "good moral character" would be admitted to the bar. Id. The 
oath reflected this motive: 
I d. 
You solemnly swear, that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to the 
doing of any in Court, and if you know of an intention to commit any 
[you shall prevent it]: You will not wittingly or willingly promote or 
sue any false, groundless, or unlawful suit ... ; you will delay no man 
for lucre or malice; but will conduct yourself ... according to the best 
of your knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity .... 
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B. Hoffman and Sharswood Were Effectively the First American 
Aspirational Creeds 
Until the 1880s, when state bar associations began to adopt 
comprehensive ethical standards, bar associations had not at-
tempted to codify ethical standards except for attempts to regulate 
bar admission standards, including educational requirements.43 
Rather, the treatises and essays of David Hoffman44 and George 
Sharswood45 "governed" the legal ethical culture in the loosest 
sense. Both men adopted a primarily aspirational approach46-an 
approach that exhorted the attorney to the nineteenth century gen-
tleman-lawyer ideal. This ideal was grounded in a moral frame-
work; their work put in print the attributes of the ideal lawyer the 
earlier oaths had sought to require and mold. Hoffman's Resolution 
XXXIII most clearly represented this morally based, aspirational 
approach: ''If, therefore, there be among my brethren, any tradi-
tional moral errors of practice, they shall be studiously avoided by 
me, though in so doing, I unhappily come in collision with what is 
... too often denominated the policy of the profession.~7 
Other resolutions more specifically articulate this gentleman-
lawyer ideal. Hoffman exhorted the attorney to "be always courte-
ous" with professional brethren,48 and called for the lawyer to not 
countenance "frivolous and vexatious defenses.~9 Resolution XXXII 
states: "I will never permit myself to enter upon a system of tactics 
. . . by the most nicely balanced artifices of disingenuousness, by 
mystery, silence, obscurity [and] suspicion . . . . Reputation gained 
for this species of skill is sure to be followed by more than an 
equivalent loss of character .... "50 
The overall focus of Hoffman's Resolutions is on the profession, 
the appropriate treatment of professional brethren, and the lawyer's 
officer-of-the-court role. The client service ethic exists in Hoffman's 
43. The earliest admission and educational standards did not stray from 
the traditional primary goal of maintaining a high level of moral fitness. See 
Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, in 1 
A.B.A. REP. 209 (1878). 
44. HOFFMAN, supra note 13. 
45. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics (1854), reprinted in 
32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1907). 
46. Neither, of course, was writing in the first instance with any authority 
to announce enforceable standards. Both, as it turned out, were in fact writing 
what became with quite little modification the first purported bar ethics codes, 
later to be incorporated into the 1908 ABA Canons. •see infra Part I. C. 
47. HOFFMAN, supra note 13, at 765. 
48. Id. at 752 (Resolution V). 
49. Id. at 754 (Resolution X). Resolution XII exhorts the attorney to not 
misuse the statute of limitations. Id. 
50. Id. at 764-65. Resolution XLIX states that "(a]varice is one of the most 
dangerous and disgusting of vices." Id. at 774. 
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Resolutions, but is subordinate to devotion to the profession itself 
and to the system of justice. 51 
The moral framework articulated by Hoffman was seized upon 
by Judge George Sharswood. Sharswood's An Essay on Professional 
Ethics52 clearly articulated the much-admired "gentleman-lawyer" 
ideal, and served as an ethical beacon for lawyers for more than one 
hundred years, first on its own and later as the model for most of 
the early state ethics codes and then the 1908 ABA Canons. 53 Shar-
swood's ethical precepts were not, of course, meant to be enforceable 
norms, but they manifest the morallaspirational basis of nineteenth 
century professional ethics.54 Sharswood began the section con-
cerning the duties the lawyer owes to his professional brethren by 
asserting that "[t]here is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the 
sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more impera-
tively necessary than that of the law."55 He continued by citing with 
approval the spirit of the traditional English oath.56 The explicit 
ethical duties that Sharswood enunciated were aspirational in na-
ture.57 Sharswood and Hoffman, taken together, clearly reflect the 
profession's tradition that these ethical pronouncements exist not 
primarily to ensure certain minimum standards of conduct, but to 
exhort the lawyer to a certain level of ideal conduct. 58 
C. Alabama Code Begins the Process; the ABA Moves from Creed 
to Code and Aspiration to Mandate in its Successive Model 
Pronouncements 
Beginning in the late 1880s, state bar associations began to 
adopt ethical codes that articulated existing professional norms.G9 
51. See id. at 752-55, 764 (Resolutions V, VII, XII, XIII, and XXXII). 
52. Sharswood, supra note 45. 
53. For a discussion of the early state ethics codes' and the 1908 ABA Can-
ons' reliance on Sharswood's Essay, see infra Part I. C. 
54. Sharswood's preface hints at the aspirational-moral bent of the ethics 
rules to come: Discussing lawyer/legislators, Sharswood comments that 
"[theirs] is the noblest work in which the intellectual powers of man can be en-
gaged, as it resembles most nearly the work of the Deity." Sharswood, supra 
note 45, at 10. 
55. Id. at 55; see also id. at 55 (asserting that "high moral principle is [the] 
only safe guide" for the young attorney). 
56. Id. at 58. 
57. See, e.g., id. at 74 (The attorney "should never unnecessarily have a 
personal difficulty with a professional brother. He should never give nor pro· 
voke insult .... Let him shun most carefully the reputation of the sharp practi-
tioner"). 
58. The distinction is important, for these different rationales have a po-
tent effect on their concomitant lega1/ethical cultures. 
59. See Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, in 31 A.B.A. 
REP. 676, 676-78 [hereinafter 1907 Committee Report]. The following states 
drafted codes of ethics during the late 1880s to the early 1900s: Alabama in 
1887, Georgia in 1889, Virginia in 1889, Michigan in 1897, Colorado in 1898, 
North Carolina in 1900, Wisconsin in 1901, West Virginia in 1902, Maryland in 
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The Alabama Code began the parade, and almost all other states 
relied heavily on it when drafting their own ethics codes.60 
The Alabama Code had had its own influence: Sharswood's 
1854 Essay on Professional Ethics,61 originally delivered in part to 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where Sharswood was a 
professor. "Anyone who is familiar with the little book by Judge 
Sharswood on 'Legal Ethics' will readily see how large a part of this 
[Alabama] code has been drawn from that source. Many of its 
maxims have been transferred word for word from Sharswood's 
treatise .... "62 Sharswood's Essay was "doubtless the inspiration 
for the Alabama code."63 Not surprisingly, the Alabama code has 
been described as "more a code of etiquette than ethics. "64 
In response to the states' movement, the ABA moved in 1905 to 
formulate its own code of professional ethics.65 In 1907, the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics, reporting the sources it was consult-
ing for the forthcoming code, had Sharswood's treatise printed as an 
addendum to the record of the annual meeting and had copies dis-
tributed to the general membership. 56 In addition to Sharswood, the 
Committee reported that it was primarily consulting the Alabama 
Code,67 three attorney oaths,68 a Lawyer's Prayer,69 and David Hoff-
man's Resolutions.70 
The 1908 ABA Canons ofEthics,71 1ike the 1887 Alabama Code, 
were, by design, similar to Hoffman's and Sharswood's works. In 
fact, many portions of the Alabama Code actually appeared verba-
1902, Kentucky in 1903, and Missouri in 1906. See id. at 676. Although the 
ethical standards thus became "official" policy, they were loosely, if ever, en-
force. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 258. 
60. See 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678 ("With the exception 
of the Louisiana Code, all the State Bar Associations Codes are formulated, al-
most totidem verbis, upon that of Alabama .... "). 
61. Sharswood, supra note 45. 
62. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678 (quoting the chairman of 
the committee drafting Kentucky's code of ethics). 
63. Id. 
64. Michael Hegarty, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment Com-
mercial Speech-Attorney Solicitation-In Re Von Wiegen, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 
191, 194 (1985). 
65. See Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American 
Bar Association, 28 A.B.A. REP. 3, 132 (1905). 
66. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 680; Sharswood, supra note 
45. 
67. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678-79, app. B. 
68. Id. at 678-79, apps. D, E, & I. The oaths were The LaWYer's Oath in 
the State of Washington, id. app. D; The Oath for Advocates Prescribed by the 
Laws of the Swiss Canton of Geneva, id. app. E; and The Oath Administered to 
laWYers in Germany on Admission to the Bar of the Respective Monarchial 
States, id. app. I. 
69. Id. app. F. 
70. Id. app. H. 
71. CANONS OF ETHICS, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575 (1908). 
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tim in the ABA Canons.72 The ABA's committee established to con-
sider the adoption of a code of professional ethics added the author 
of the Alabama code, Judge Thomas Goode Jones,73 to the committee 
as it began to draft its own canons of ethics.74 Consequently, Judge 
Jones attended the three-day session from which the 1908 Code 
emerged.75 Judge Jones's attendance likely made the influence of 
the Alabama Code even greater. 
Another, though lesser, influence on the ABA Canons was 
David Hoffman's Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, 
fifty suggestions for lawyers included in his 1836 book on a general 
course of study for lawyers.76 Both Sharswood's and Hoffman's 
works were reprinted in the ABA Reports. Sharswood's Essay was 
given its own volume within the Reports/7 and Hoffman's Resolu-
tions appeared in the appendix to the ABA Report of the Committee 
on Code of Professional Ethics.78 The basis of both the early state 
codes and the ABA Canons, therefore, remained strongly moral and 
aspirational. 
With these strongly moral-based premises in mind,79 the ABA 
promulgated its comprehensive Canons of Professional Ethics in 
1908. The provisions of the Canons themselves often evince their 
aspirational underpinnings.8° Canon 17 states: "Whatever may be 
72. See Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 
A.B.A REP. 567, 569 (1908) ("The foundation of the draft for canon of ethics, 
herewith submitted, is the code adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association 
in 1887 .... ") [hereinafter 1908 Final Committee Report]. 
73. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678. Judge Jones was a 
"confederate war hero, frontier judge and legislator, [and] eventually governor 
of Alabama." Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 319, 321 (1987). 
74. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 679. 
75. See 1908 Final Committee Report, supra note 72, at 569. 
76. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, at 678-79. 
77. Id. at 680; Sharswood, supra note 45. 
78. 1907 Committee Report, supra note 59, app. H. 
79. See Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 
COLUM. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (1908). 
They [Hoffman and Sharswood] frequently seek to fortifY a canon of 
conduct by subjoining an argument for following it. The reasons given 
are generally those of policy. Follow it, they argue, because you will 
succeed better in your profession if you do. . . . Be prompt and punc-
tual, and it will strengthen your hold on your clients. The new code of 
the American Bar Association makes no such appeals to motives of 
expediency and self-advantage. It occupies a higher plane. Its canons 
are left to rest on principles of right and honor. 
Id. Baldwin was the initiator of the ABA in 1878. See Maureen J. Arrigo, Hi-
erarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70 
TEMP. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (1997). 
80. See 1908 Final Committee Report, supra note 72, at 574. Indeed, the 
official text of the Code is preceded by the statements: 1) "Craft is the vice, not 
the spirit of the profession," id. (quoting Edward G. Ryan); and 2) "Discourage 
litigation," id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln). 
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the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to 
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other 
•••• "
81 Canon 22 exhorts the attorney to always act with "candor 
and fairness" in his professional dealings.82 With the 1908 Canons 
of Ethics, the moral foundations of the "gentleman-lawyer" ideal 
were articulated as the national profession's ideal. Despite this 
code-like articulation, however, the moral, aspirational nature of 
the prevailing ethical philosophy did not change: with advertising 
and solicitation rules excepted, the Canons were not drafted in lan-
guage of nor primarily intended to be applied as enforceable rules.83 
Virtually the only substantive changes from Hoffman and Shar-
swood to the Alabama code and then the ABA Canons relate to di-
rect client-getting and contingent fees. These changes reflected a 
largely self- and client-interested activity by the Canons' drafters 
whose moral standards and clients' accounts were offended by the 
pursuit of claims by injured plaintiffs against their corporate cli-
ents. Such claims would be far less likely to be brought if urban, 
ethnic, underclass lawyers could be restrained from advertising 
about their services, soliciting the business of injured persons, and 
offering contingent fee arrangements to those unable to afford a 
pay-as~you-go lawyer fee. 
Although it is clear that many client-getting activities had long 
been subject to disdain,84 the additions to the Canons regarding cli-
ent-getting from the very limited mention of them in the Canons' 
models-Sharswood and Hoffman-are striking in their reproval: 
Canon 27 grudgingly approves of business cards as being "not per se 
improper. But solicitation of business by ... advertisements, or by 
personal communication ... is unprofessional. . . . [S]elf-laudation 
... [is] intolerable."85 Thus, during the period leading up to and 
then proceeding from the adoption of the 1908 Canons through the 
next thirty years at least, the bar got stronger, not weaker, in its in-
sistence on no advertising: in 1854 Sharswood said nothing about 
81. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 17, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 580 
(1908). 
82. Id. Canon 22, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 581 (1908); see also id. 
Canon 23, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908) ("Attitude Toward Jury"); 
id. Canon 29, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 583 (1908) ("Upholding the 
Honor of the Profession"); id. Canon 32, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 584 
(1908) ("The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis"). 
83. The Canons were not meant to have the effect of positive law; they 
would, however, come to be regarded as important guidelines for lawyer con-
duct the violation of which might lead to discipline. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, 
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 55 (practitioner's ed. 1986). By 1914, 30 
states had adopted the ABA Canons "with little or no change." Report of the 
Committee on Professional Ethics, 39 A.B.A. REP. 559, 560-61 (1914). 
84. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 25; WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 14.2.2, at 
776-77. 
85. CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 27, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 582 
(1908). 
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advertising restrictions;86 in the 1880's the Alabama Code permitted 
a fair amount of newspaper advertising.87 Warvelle allowed for 
some as well.88 Some early writers professed to find tolerable even 
in-person solicitation, though they would not engage in it person-
ally.89 In the nineteenth century, testimonials of satisfied clients 
were also reportedly used.90 But since 1937, a year in which the 
Canons were amended,91 "all such advertisement has been con-
demned."92 
The 1908 Canons of Ethics were the principle touchstone for at-
torney conduct for many years. "A consensus grew among the bar, 
however, that the Canons were incomplete, unorganized, and failed 
to recognize the· distinction between the inspirational and the pro-
scriptive."93 Consequently, the ABA promulgated the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in 1969.94 In 1983, the ABA adopted the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a replacement for the 1969 
Code.95 
The 1908 Canons remained the official governing norm of the 
legal profession until the ABA promulgated a comprehensive refor-
mulation in 1969.96 Prior to the 1969 Model Code, the ethical norms 
of the profession were largely rooted in the moral consensus of the 
leaders of the organized bar. Thus, the ethical restrictions govern-
ing attorneys were largely aspirational97 rather than mandatory in 
character. With the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility98-and 
the subsequent Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disciplinary 
86. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213. 
87. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS Rule 16, reprinted in DRINKER, supra note 18, app. 
F at356. 
88. W ARVELLE, supra note 18, § 86, at 52. 
89. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213 (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE 
OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 608 (Random House, Inc. 1950) (1791)). 
90. See William L. Wheeler, Lawyer Advertising: The Way it Was in the 
Good Old Days, ILL. B.J., Oct. 1978, at 90, 92-93. 
9L See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, in 62 A.B.A. REP. 216, 350-52 
(1937). 
92. DRINKER, supra note 18, at 213. 
93. Don J. Young & Louise L. Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for In-
ternal Control, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 205, 208 (1988). 
94. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Stan-
dards, 94 A.B.A. REP. 728, 728 (1969). 
95. See WOLFRAl\f, supra note 83, § 2.6.4, at 60-63 (discussing the criticism 
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the ABA's subsequent 
promulgation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
96. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Stan-
dards, 94 A.B.A. REP. 728, 729-30 (1969). 
97. Pre-1969 norms of conduct were not codified futo a strict set of enforce-
able rules. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.2, at 55. This nonenforceable 
nature enabled earlier codes to appeal to the attorney's moral suasions-they 
were, therefore, aspirational. 
98. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969), reprinted in 94 
A.B.A. REP. 729 (1969). Within a few years, virtually every state had adopted 
the ABA's Code. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 56. 
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Proceedings99-the ABA sought for the first time to lobby state judi-
cial systems to officially adopt and enforce the ABA's ethical frame-
work.100 This fundamental change of purpose marked the beginning 
of the shift from aspirational goals toward mandatory minimum 
standards and rules. In order to make the 1969 Code palatable-
i.e., practically enforceable-the outwardly moral, almost purely as-
pirational stance of the 1908 Code had to be abandoned.101 In the 
attempt to establish minimum enforceable standards of behavior, 
the ABA largely abandoned its moral rationale for promulgating its 
code of ethics in the first place.102 The moral rationale and aspira-
tional focus were retained in a more limited form in the Ethical 
Considerations which followed each Canon and Disciplinary Rule in 
the 1969 Code, but the Ethical Considerations were now meant to 
provide "guidance"103 and were no longer considered essential at-
tributes of the "good"104 attorney. Moral aspirations are largely ab-
sent from the 1983 Model Rules-the ethical culture of the legal 
99. Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, 104 
A.B.A. REP. 373, 374 (1979). 
100. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 56. 
101. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 258. "The message [of the 1908 Code] 
was lofty, but hard to enforce. If the Bar was to rid itself [of bad lawyers] ... 
both more formal disciplinary procedures and more precise statements of pro-
fessional standards were required." Id.; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The 
Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1250-51 (1993). Hazard states that 
[t]he Canons presupposed that right-thinking lawyers knew the 
proper thing to do and that most lawyers were right-thinking. . . . 
[T]he Canons had no direct legal effect ... [and] functioned not as en-
forceable legal standards but as evidence of such standards. 
The transformation of the norms of professional conduct was princi-
pally effected by the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility .... 
Id. Indeed, the Professionalism Report was itself a later attempt to replaced 
the beginning-to-be-lost aspirational element of organized bar ethics pro-
nouncements. 
102. See JACK L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 63-64 (1988). Sam-
mons stated that the evolution from the 1908 Canons to the 1969 Code to the 
1983 Model Rules was 
evolution from morals to ethics to ethical regulation to rules oflaw. It 
is an evolution moving constantly in the direction of increasing coer-
civeness and, as it does, necessarily reducing the profession's guid-
ance from aspiration to minimally acceptable conduct. We went very 
quickly from what not to be to what not to do. . . . It is easy ... to con-
fuse compliance with the rules with being moral and it is easy to con-
fuse minimally acceptable conduct with acting as a professional." 
ld. See also EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN LIGHT 
OF AMERICAN LAw 38 (1966) (stating that legal codification can utilize a mini-
mum-standards approach at the expense of the aspiration for an ideal form of 
behavior). 
103. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILITY pmbl. and preface 
(1969). 
104. See id. 
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profession now wholly embraced a pragmatic minimum-standards 
b . 105 aBlS. 
In fact, the notion of an adopted, enforceable lawyer code is of 
quite recent origin. The first ABA pronouncement, the 1908 Can-
ons, based as they were on the work of Hoffman and to a greater de-
gree Sharswood, was in fact more creed than code. The ABA made 
little effort to encourage states to adopt the Canons as enforceable 
standards.106 Even in the 1970s, as the ABA changed its course to a 
more aggressive pressing on the states of the Model Code as a pro-
posed enforceable code of conduct, the model urged was the familiar 
combination of rules-the Disciplinary Rules-and aspirational 
statements-the Ethical Considerations. A former faculty colleague 
related the telling first day experience as a student in his late 1970s 
professional responsibility course. The instructor explained his 
trick for remembering the relative importance and roles of the Dis-
ciplinary Rules and the Ethical Considerations: he said that if a 
lawyer did not heed the Disciplinary Rules (DR's), she would create 
a "Darned Ruckus," but that she should only consider the Ethical 
Considerations (EC's) if she wanted to be "Extra Careful." In effect, 
the Model Code straddled the uncomfortable fence between a creed-
like system and a code-like system. The structure of the Model 
Code is itself a clear indication of the bar's ambivalence about en-
forceable rules and its continued clinging to the notion that lawyers 
did not need ethics rules, they needed a voluntary creed to which a 
pledge of good behavior could be made. 
In truth, the Model Rules were the first g,ure code for lawyers. 
AB the Kutak Commission drafted the Rules, and as the ABA de-
bated, adopted and then urged them on the states, an important 
feature of the Rules was the change to a more statute/restatement-
like format from the awkward marriage of rule and aspiration that 
had been the Model Code's format. Ironically, but perhaps not coin-
cidentally, the ABA's move toward enforceable, mandatory rules 
and away from aspirational statements has coincided with the 
popularity of state and local bar adopted creeds.108 Indeed, the ABA 
105. The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1969) and CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CoNDUCT (1972) only furthered the retreat from a moral rationale of 
ethics by abandoning the Code's Ethical Considerations. 
106. See WoLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.2, at 54. 
107. See id. § 2.6.4, at 60. 
108. This same move has also coincided with a move toward "other law" 
based ethics rules. As the rules have become enforceable, they have had to ref-
erence and account for the existence of coordinate areas of law that have al-
ways governed lawyer civil and criminal liability. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, 
§§ 4.1 to .2, at 146-50, § 6. 7.3, at 299, § 13.5.3, at 713 (agency); id. § 4.2, at 148-
54, §§ 6.3.1 to .3.2, at 250-52 (contract); id. § 13.3.6, at 698-701, §§ 13.5.2 to 
.5.8, at 712-27 (fraud). "One perusing the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model Rules 
will discover that, in the last analysis, little is required of lawyers that is not 
already required by other law-the law of crimes, torts, contracts, property, 
agency, evidence." Id. § 2.6.1, at 49. 
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model creed is itself partly a replacement of the Code's lost aspira-
tional side. 
D. The Rise of the Modern Creed 
Chief Justice Warren Burger addressed the American Bar As-
sociation in 1984 and decried a decline in professionalism.109 Burger 
enunciated a widespread perception that the Bar only lived up to 
the minimum standards as articulated in the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.110 The ABA's prompt response in the form of the 
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism m validated 
this perception, 112 and essentially argued that the strictures of the 
Model Rules, in and of themselves, did not create an acceptable 
level of professionalism.113 Among other recommendations, the re-
port advocated the adoption of non-enforceable ethical creeds that 
would exhort the lawyer to conform to standards above the mini-
mum standards of the Rules.114 In 1988, the ABA House of Dele-
gates recommended that state and local bar associations adopt 
creeds of professional conduct.115 Subsequently, the ABA Torts and 
Insurance Practice Section adopted such a creed.116 The ABA House 
of Delegates also approved a creed created by the Young Lawyers' 
Section called a Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism.117 The ABA 
creed was similar to the 1989 Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate 
109. Chief Justice Warren W. Burger, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of 
the American Bar Association (Feb. 13-14, 1984), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 
(Feb. 28, 1984). 
110. Id., reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984). In 1984, Jus-
tice Burger was speaking at a time when few states had actually adopted the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA's House 
of Delegates in 1983. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.4, at 62-63. 
111. Blueprint, supra note 2. 
112. See id. at 265 ("All segments of the Bar should: . . . [r]esolve to abide 
by higher standards of conduct than the minimum required by the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."). 
113. The ABA Blueprint for Professionalism attributed some of the short-
comings to external economic pressure, and thus stopped short of totally inter-
nalizing the blame. Id. at 257 ("Rhetoric about the 'special' character of the 
profession remains, but the reality is that, as a matter of law, lawyers must 
now face tough economic competition with respect to almost everything they 
do."). 
114. See id. at 296-97. 
115. See ABA/BNA, LAWYERS MANuAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:401 
(1994). 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
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for Professionalism.118 State and local bar associations quickly 
seized the bait and began to draft non-binding creeds.110 
The interest in new creeds has grown dramatically in recent 
years. While it has been said that the proliferation of creeds is a re-
sponse to the "recent awareness of the civility crisis, or more appro-
priately, the shift in focus to the cure of the civility crisis,"120 the rise 
in creed-need has also paralleled the change in ABA model stan-
dard focus from aspiration to rule orientation. 
Much of the substance in the new wave of creeds mirrors the 
work of Hoffman and Sharswood, whose work was more creed than 
code. The irony of the Hoffman/Sharswood story is this: they wrote 
a description of the ideal nineteenth century lawyer, to which law-
yers should aspire; their work was used by the organized bar to 
form the basis of the profession's first uniform ethics pronounce-
ments; these ethics pronouncements in turn formed the basis for the 
profession's first sets of enforceable rules; and traces of their work 
are now evident in the organized bar's effort to revitalize aspiration 
by way of the creeds. 
II. CREEDS, AS AsPIRATION, ARE NATURAL, GoOD AND INEVITABLE, 
BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED 
Because creeds are a nearly inevitable response to the profes-
sion's need to aspire, we will always have them. It is perfectly natu-
ral and healthy for a profession to aspire to something beyond en-
forceable norms. The best of such aspiration performs service for 
the profession by encouraging conduct that both complies with the 
enforceable norms and expresses the moral understanding, the 
moral common-ground of the profession's members.121 
If creeds are to exist, they should not be enforceable for two rea-
sons. First, making an aspiration enforceable converts it to a rule. 
That conversion creates a new "aspiration gap," such as was created 
by the ABA's move from aspiration to rule in the models.122 New 
forms of aspiration to replace the old will be found, and the cycle 
will continue: aspiration should remain aspiration unless and until 
its theme becomes incorporated through normal process into en-
forceable rules; enforcement without such a normal process conver-
118. See generally Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's 
Creed: A Mandate for Professionalism, 10 REV. LITIG. 673 (1991) (discussing and 
analyzing the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism). 
119. As of late 1995, twenty-six states and sixty-two local bar associations 
had adopted creeds. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Pro· 
fessionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REV. 259, at 278 n.74 (1995). 
120. Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Professionalism in the Prac-
tice of Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 537 n.49 (1994). 
121. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 4-5 (1993). 
122. For a discussion of the ABA's move from aspiration to rule in the mod-
els, see supra Part I. C. 
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sion eliminates the benefit of aspiration. Second, the current creeds 
should not be enforceable because they are based in part on a ra-
tionale that may be sensible for exhortation but that fails as a ra-
tionale for an enforceable rule: namely the rationale expressed 
within many of the creeds saying essentially that, "I will be civil be-
cause doing so furthers my client's interests."123 Enforceable rules 
are interpreted to apply when their rationales are furthered by the 
results of their application. Because most uncivil lawyers' stan-
dards are based on the stated purpose of furthering their clients' in-
terests, 124 and because some uncivil behavior undoubtedly does fur-
ther client interest, the current creeds will not be followed and 
ought not apply to a wide range of conduct because the rule's stated 
rationale is undermined by enforcement of the rule. 
Unfortunately, there is a serious risk that the creeds will be 
mistakenly enforced by courts and perhaps state bar disciplinary 
authorities. Just as some courts used the Model Code's non-
mandatory Ethical Considerations to support the imposition of dis-
cipline, 125 some courts are edging toward the use of the creeds to 
support various sanctions. 
The creed most often cited in case law is the Texas Lawyer's 
Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism, adopted November 7, 
1989.126 Although the Creed's Order of Adoption states that the 
rules are "primarily aspirational," the Creed has been used as a ba-
sis for penalties, such as sanctions, as some of the following cases 
illustrate.127 
When a plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions and censure 
against the defendant's attorney, a federal district court sanctioned 
the attorney for intentionally misleading opposing counsel in order 
to obtain ex parte interviews with opposing party witnesses.128 The 
Horner court cited both the Texas Lawyer's Creed and the section of 
123. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989) 
("The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals are commit-
ted to eliminating ... in our state ... abusive tactics which have surfaced in 
many parts of our country. We believe such tactics are ... harmful to clients."). 
124. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 23, at 48. 
125. See, e.g., Committee on Prof! Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar 
ABs'n v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280, 285-86 (Iowa 1979). 
126. See Cook, supra note 118, at 674-75. 
127. See, e.g., McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482 
(5th Cir. 1990). In McLeod, the defendant, proceeding for part of the case pro 
se as a former client of the plaintiff-law firm, failed to respond, without good 
cause, to discovery requests by the plaintiff. Id. at 1483-84. The appeals court, 
upholding the district court's adoption of a magistrate's order of default judg-
ment against the defendant, cited the specific rule of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure used by the magistrate-Rule 37-for default judgment. Id. at 1484-
86. The appeals court also cited a section of The Texas Lawyers' Creed-A 
Mandate for Professionalism, which requires attorneys to comply with reason-
able discovery requests. Id. at 1486-87. 
128. Homer v. Rowan Co., Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
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the Texas Disciplinary Rule prohibiting dishonesty with another at-
torney.129 Although the court referred only to the disciplinary rule 
as "mandatory and [having] the status of law,"130 the court cited the 
Creed as a part of its reasoning toward the imposition of sanc-
tions.131 The sanctions were attorneys' fees and relevant expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff incident to the motion.132 
The same court had previously threatened application of the 
Texas Lawyer's Creed as a sanctions rule in another case.133 Ruling 
on various discovery motions filed in a patent infringement lawsuit, 
the court, after granting the defendant's motion to compel the com-
pletion of a deposition, stated, "Counsel are admonished that their 
failure to comply with the Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for 
Professionalism promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas and 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and adopted by this court will 
result in monetary sanctions being imposed against counsel indi-
vidually."134 The court's warning is effectively an enforcement of the 
creed. 
The Texas Lawyer's Creed was also referred to in two state 
court decisions. Shortly after the adoption of the Creed, a concur-
ring judge condemned the action of an attorney who served as both 
counsel and witness for his client.135 The attorney should be sanc-
tioned, said the judge, by whatever punishment the Texas Su12reme 
Court or the district grievance committee deems appropriate.1a6 The 
judge cited the two-week old Creed as additional authority.137 Al-
though the judge did not say that sanctions should flow directly 
from the Creed, he remarked that the Creed is a necessary response 
to the increasing abuse in the legal system.138 
A pro se attorney seeking to recover damages and attorneys fees 
from a former client was held to have acted unethically and to have 
violated the Texas Lawyer's Creed by seeking a default judgment 
against parties who had filed their answer under the wrong case 
number, and who the attorney knew were represented by legal 
counsel.139 The court cited the Creed provision that states that a 
lawyer will "'not take advantage, by causing any default or dis-
missal to be rendered, when [he or she knows] the identity of an op-
129. Id. at 603. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. (citing Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism 
(1989)). 
132. See id. 
133. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 131 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Tex. 
1990). 
134. Id. at 674. 
135. Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (Nye, 
C.J., concurring). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 531 n.3. 
138. Id. 
139. Owens v. Neely, 866 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
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posing counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel's inten-
tion to proceed.'"140 
The Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed and Guidelines for 
Professional Courtesy, both adopted in 1987, were used as the basis 
of a federal district court's adoption of standards of litigation con-
duct.141 The standards, in eleven sections, were taken nearly verba-
tim from sections of the two Dallas Bar Association documents.142 
Prefacing the newly adopted standards, the court commented on the 
need for litigation standards, which, like creeds, are becoming in-
creasingly necessary to combat lawyers' indirect attacks on the ad-
ministration of justice.143 The court described its view of the need 
for and appropriate role oflawyer creeds: 
We address today a problem that, though of relatively recent 
origin, is so pernicious that it threatens to delay the admini-
stration of justice and to place litigation beyond the financial 
reach of litigants. With alarming frequency, we find that 
valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in resolving 
unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers. 
Judges and magistrates of this court are required to devote 
substantial attention to refereeing abusive litigation tactics 
that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction. Our 
system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce resources to su-
pervising matters that do not advance the resolution of the 
merits of a case; nor can justice long remain available to de-
serving litigants if the costs of litigation are fueled unneces-
sarily to the point of being prohibitive.144 
The courtesy creed discussed and adopted as an enforceable, 
sanction-supporting code by the court was applied in a wrongful re-
fusal to pay insurance claims case.145 The insurance company's law-
yers filed a late brief,146 arguably emulating their client's delaying 
tactics that were the subject of the plaintiffs claim.147 Not only was 
the brief filed late, but it was filed late without the lawyers either 
requesting consent for the late filing from the plaintiff or seeking 
leave of court to excuse the lateness.146 The insurance company 
lawyers had "clearly violated" the filing and leave of court require-
ments.149 The court was justifiably concerned about the company's 
140. Id. at 720 n.2 (quoting Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Profes-
sionalism). 
141. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 
284,287-88 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 
142. See id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 286. 
145. See id. at 285. 
146. See id. at 286. 
147. See id. at 285, 289. 
148. See id. at 291. 
149. Id. 
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lawyers' neglect and tardiness.150 When the plaintiffs lawyer moved 
to strike the late filing, as the court's rules explicitly and under-
standably authorized them to do, 151 the court indicated its inclina-
tion to sanction the plaintiffs lawyers under the courtesy creed.162 
Speculating on its view that attorney conduct has deteriorated, the 
court mentioned several possible causes: the increase in the size of 
the bar has decreased collegiality; the legal profession has become 
merely a business; and veteran attorneys have ceased to teach new 
lawyers proper standards of conduct.153 
Unlike the Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed and Guide-
lines for Professional Courtesy, which do not mention sanctions or 
other methods of enforcement, the district court in Dondi does dis-
cuss consequences of creed violations. Violations of these creeds 
will result in "an appropriate response from the court, including the 
range of sanctions the Fifth Circuit suggests in the Rule 11 context: 
'a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand 
in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or 
other measures appropriate to the circumstances.'"154 
Aspirational creeds should not be used to police lawyer conduct 
that complies with the language of procedural rules such as Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, default judgment rules, or 
filing deadlines enforcement rules. If a currently authorized prac-
tice, such as moving for default judgment when no answer has been 
timely filed or moving to strike a late-filed brief, ought rather to be 
prohibited, then the procedural . rules should themselves be 
amended to reflect the measure of diligence with which lawyers 
should be expected to enforce violations. Rule 11 is the best exam-
ple: in 1993, it was amended to include a safe-harbor provision, re-
quiring notice to opposing counsel and an opportunity to cure a de-
fect before proceeding to court enforcement of Rule 11's strictures.165 
If lawyers should be expected to notify opposing counsel that op-
posing counsel's brief or pleading is late before proceeding to seek 
default judgment or late filing sanctions, then the appropriate rules 
should be amended to reflect such a requirement. Lawyers ought to 
be expected to seek enforcement of the rules as those rules are writ-
ten rather than be expected to be a gentleman to opposing counsel 
while compromising client interests. This is not a new, uncivil way 
150. Id. 
151. Naturally, as contemplated by the rules, in the first instance the option 
of complaining about party misconduct such as late filings should rest with the 
opposing party. 
152. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287-89; see also Monroe Freedman, In the Matter 
of Manners, LEGAL TIMEs, March 11, 1991, at 23 (recounting the Dondi court's 
stated intention to impose sanctions on lawyers who violate the courtesy creed). 
153. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286. 
154. Id. at 288 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th 
Cir. 1988}). 
155. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. 
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of thinking. Warvelle described the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century "general practice" as follows: 
[I]t is the client's right to have his cause tried at the time set; 
to have adverse pleadings filed within the time allowed; and to 
insist that his attorney shall take every legal advantage the 
case may afford, and this duty an attorney may not capri-
ciously avoid nor is he at liberty to withdraw from the case 
merely because his client insists upon the strict observance of 
his rights. Whatever the feelings of counsel may be toward the 
counsel for the other side, and however much he may desire to 
accommodate him in matters of practice, he is yet under a 
paramount duty to follow his client's instructions in all mat-
ters pertaining to the legitimate conduct of the litigation.156 
A. The Creeds Should Not Be Enforceable Because Enforcement 
Defeats the Aspirational Nature of the Creeds' Statements 
There is a place for both aspiration and rule in the official or-
ganized bar and court statements about lawyer behavior. Manda-
tory rules are needed to provide reliable standards for the imposi-
tion of discipline and to give the public a set of standards by which 
it is fair for them to expect lawyers to abide as a group.157 Clients 
and the public have a justifiable expectation that the licensing of 
lawyers, like other professionals, includes an acceptance by the in-
dividual professional and an enforcement by the profession of a set 
of concrete standards. These standards are not aspirational; they 
are mandatory.158 
There is also a place for professional aspirational statements. 
Aspirational pronouncements provide both a psychological159 and a 
pragmatic, public relations benefit to the individual professional 
and to the profession. The desire for these benefits are in signifi-
cant measure responsible for the rise of the modern lawyer creeds; 
they have replaced the aspirational "elements of the former organ-
ized bar ethics pronouncements when they were stripped first from 
156. WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 317, at 197; see also JOSEPH G. BALDWIN, 
THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1854) (stating that older lawyers in the 1830s took 
advantage of "quirks and quibbles" to prevail for their clients against those of 
younger lawyers), reprinted in DENNIS R. NOLAN, READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF 
THEAMERICANLEGALPROFESSION 113-15 (1980). 
157. See, e.g., Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching 
Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL Enuc. 1, 3 (1963). 
158. For a discussion of the distinctions between aspirational and manda-
tory statements about professional conduct, see W ARVELLE, supra note 18, § 15-
19, at 9-12. See also William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law, 38 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 217 (1996). 
159. See, e.g., SmYLLE K ESCANOLA, AN APPLICATION OF THE LEVEL OF 
AsPIRATION EXPERIMENT TO THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 4-6 (1948); .ARCHmALD 0. 
HALLER & IRWIN W. MILLER, THE OCCUPATIONAL AsPIRATION SCALE: THEORY, 
STRUCTURE AND CORRELATES 11 (1971). 
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the Canons to the Model Code and then almost entirely eliminated 
from the Model Code to the Model Rules.160 
To a very great extent, the modern creed is a sought-for re-
placement for the former, now lost, ABA sponsored aspirational 
statements of the Canons and Code. To this extent, the modern 
creed drafter must attend to the goals of that aspirational activity, 
and courts and disciplinary bodies should refrain from enforcing 
them. Once enforced, an aspirational statement becomes a rule and 
then benefits derived from aspiration are lost. Inevitably, the pro-
fession needs and will have aspirations. Enforcing aspirations con-
verts them to rules and leaves the need for aspiration wanting. 
B. The Creeds Should Not Be Enforceable Because Their Rationale 
Will Fail to Support Effective Rule Enforcement 
There are two categories of rationales for the promises or com-
mitments of a creed: moral rationales and pragmatic ones. Simply 
and very generally stated, commitments based on moral rationales 
discourage conduct that is wrong and encourage conduct that is 
right;161 pragmatic rationales discourage conduct that fails to fur-
ther instrumental ends-it doesn't work-and encourage conduct 
that does further instrumental ends-it works.162 
Creeds, dating back to the aspirational sections of the lawyer 
oaths and Hoffman and Sharswood's descriptive writings, 163 even 
while being aspirational have been based largely on the moral ra-
tionale and only occasionally on the pragmatic rationale.164 Many 
aspects of the modern creeds are unfortunately based in part on 
pragmatic, specifically client-furthering rationales. For example, 
the Virginia Lawyers' Creed requires the lawyer to promise to 
"always recognize that uncivil conduct does not advance and may 
compromise the rights of my clients."165 Lawyers who engage in un-
civil conduct are not buying. Lawyers who engage in uncivil con-
duct do so primarily to further their clients'-and vicariously their 
own-interests: "Hardball is vigorous advocacy for your client."166 
"[T]he tug between doing right by your client and [doing] justice" 
160. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 257-59. 
161. For example, "I will not lie to my client because it is wrong to lie," or "I 
am civil to opposing counsel because it is right to behave so." 
162. For example, "I do not lie to my client because I will lose clients or be-
cause poor communication with my client will diminish the service I can pro-
vide for my client," or "I will be civil to opposing counsel because such conduct 
will produce referrals to me or because such conduct will allow me to make a 
better deal for my client or represent my client more effectively in court." 
163. For a discussion of Hoffman's and Sharswood's writings as the first 
American creeds, see supra Part I.B. 
164. For a discussion of the moral basis of Hoffman and Sharswood's writ-
ings, see supra Part I.B. 
165. Virginia Bar Association Creed (1996) (on file with author). 
166. Goldberg, supra note 23, at 49. 
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makes hardball a way oflife for the lawyer.167 "[A]nyone ... [who] 
cannot fulfill the prescribed obligations of a professional [including 
the use of aggressive tactics for a client] should not undertake those 
obligations."168 Lawyers treat litigation as "war" to impress clients, 
send a message to opposing parties, and prove that the best defense 
. d cc. 169 IS a goo o.uense. 
In a real way, the same pragmatic rationales that filtered 
somewhat into Sharswood's work and that appear in many of to-
day's creeds are in the same form that animated the early bar's cli-
ent-interested emphasis on the advertising and contingent fee rules 
in the ABA Canons. Just as Sharswood advises against engaging in 
certain conduct because the conduct harms-at least fails to fur-
ther-the lawyer's interests or harms-at least fails to further-the 
client's interests, so may be seen the Canons' emphasis on prohib-
iting advertising and contingent fees.170 The Canons drafters did 
not advertise because it was unnecessary to their business inter-
ests;171 they did not advertise because doing so would not further 
their or their clients' interests; they prohibited advertising and re-
strained contingent fees because doing so did further their business 
interests and their clients' interests. 
In his classic work, Holmes argued that it was the province of 
the law to establish certain minimum enforceable standards of be-
havior.172 He argued that to enforce such minimum standards, the 
law must address the "bad man."173 This "bad man," caring nothing 
for the moral norms embodied in a stricture, is only concerned with 
the material consequences of breach-he is only concerned with how 
his behavior will materially affect his well-being.174 
167. ld. at 50. 
168. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065 (1976). 
169. Haig & Getman, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting a local bar president). 
170. In some forms, of course, client-getting and contingent fees were always 
prohibited as maintenance and champerty, but so were fraud and conversion 
always prohibited. Some further explanation of the early bar's emphasis on 
advertising and contingent fees other than the traditional criminal sanctions 
for maintenance and champerty is needed to explain their prominence and dis-
tinction among topics addressed in the Canons. See generally Max Radin, 
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935) (discussing the Canons in 
relation to contingent fees and advertising). 
171. They had essentially agreed not to compete with one another for cli-
ents. See DRINKER, supra note 18, at 5, 190-91; WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 
324, at 205-06. 
172. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 
(1897), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 
(1920). 
173. !d., reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
170 (1920). 
17 4. See id., reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 170-71 (1920) (presenting the clearest statement of his thesis). 
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Arguably, more lawyers are today modeled on Holmes' "bad 
man."175 As such, their behavior must be governed to a greater ex-
tent by pragmatic interests than by moral suasion. This the ABA 
has effectively done by moving its models from aspiration to en-
forceable rule.176 Although the Model Rules are not generally-
legislated norms of the type addressed by Holmes, the ABA essen-
tially used Holmes' rationale and philosophy in promulgating the 
new standards.177 As with legislation, the Model Rules are an at-
tempt by the ABA to establish enforceable minimum standards of 
professional behavior; they adopt the assumption that lawyers are 
"bad men." 
This pragmatic, sanction/benefit-based rationale works quite 
well as the basis for enforceable rules in the Model Rules, but it is 
misplaced in the currently dominant creeds. At the heart of the 
creed movement is an attempt by the organized bar to infuse law-
yers with a "spirit" of professionalism.178 Each creed is an attempt 
by the bar to exhort lawyers to move beyond the minimum stan-
dards as enunciated by the ABA.179 It is, no doubt, an attempt to 
change lawyers from "bad men" to "good men," such as the creed 
promoters recall them to have been in earlier times.180 A pragmatic 
basis for such a creed is self-defeating, for it embraces the notion 
that one should act according to the material consequences of one's 
behavior. If the creed's purpose is to encourage lawyers to act with-
out reference to such self- or client-serving interests, then a prag-
matic base will fail in both encouragement and enforcement.181 
Even if the purpose of the present creed movement was not to ex-
hort attorneys to look beyond the material consequences of their ac-
tions, a pragmatic rationale would still be inappropriate in an en-
forcement environment. Enforceable rules are no better than their 
rationales. These enforceable rules are no different. If an enforce-
175. See KRONMAN, supra note 121, at 126-27. 
176. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 257-59 (stating that the ABA codes of 
conduct have moved from aspirational terms to minimum-standards rules). 
177. See id. at 259 ("[L]awyers have tended to take the rules more seriously 
because of an increased fear of disciplinary prosecutions .... "). 
178. See id. at 257-58. 
179. See id. at 259. 
180. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Le-
gal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 
393 (1991) ("The recurrent movement to call or recall lawyers to professional-
ism is a moral argument."); see also id. at 397 ("I think that the A.B.A.'s uni-
dentified ideal ... when it claims that to be professional is to be a good person, 
is the American gentleman-lawyer."). 
181. Self interest, such as the love of money has long (always?) been a 
source of uncivil or unethical attorney conduct. A member of a Texas law fac-
ulty said in 1906, "I doubt whether a course of lectures on moral conduct will 
revolutionize the morality of the Bar. The evil ... is not so much a professional 
as an American fault. It has its source in our inordinate love for the almighty 
dollar." 1906AALS Proceedings, supra note 7, at 10-11. 
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able creed's rationale is pragmatic, then the creed's rules should not 
apply when their pragmatic rationale would not be furthered by en-
forcement of the rule; the "bad man's" analysis would say that when 
the pragmatic rationale fails, so does the rule. Whenever breach 
would further the client's ends, the lawyer would-and should-
choose not to abide by a creed that was pragmatically based.182 As 
both Hoffman and Sharswood did, telling lawyers that discouraged 
conduct is ineffective conduct may work well as a hortatory device, 
but a like-based demand in an enforceable rule fails. 
As the creeds become treated as if they were enforceable rules, 
their rationale, of course, becomes critical. As with any other legal 
rule, the rule is its rationale, and it may be expected that an en-
forceable lawyer rule will be appropriately ignored when its ration-
ale fails to account for a particular proposed application of the rule. 
A particular error of some of the creeds has been the tendency to 
base them in part on client interests.183 Some creeds purport to rest 
in part on the rationale that, as a lawyer, one should not be uncivil 
with opponents because such conduct harms the client's interests.184 
Unfortunately, a creed based on such a rationale is doomed to fail. 
It may be that uncivil, hardball conduct sometimes harms client in-
terests, but lawyers who engage in such conduct do so largely be-
cause they believe that it furthers client interests.185 When, as is al-
most inevitable, a lawyer believes that uncivil conduct will further 
client interest, lawyers who would normally apply the rule will ap-
propriately ignore it. Even the ABA, and not merely the bad apples 
of the profession that the ABA has always complained of, stages 
seminars designed to introduce lawyers to the methods of "Killer 
Cross."186 These are tactics that lawyers, including leaders of the 
organized bar, believe benefit their clients at least some of the time. 
182. See Simon, supra note 158, at 218-20. 
183. "As a professional, I should always ... recognize that uncivil conduct 
does not advance and may compromise the rights of my clients." The Virginia 
Bar Association Creed (1996) (on file with author). "I will act at all times to 
preserve the mutual feeling of camaraderie among lawyers ... because without 
it my clients and I suffer." Pulaski County Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Courtesy lj[ 23 (1986) (on file with author). "[E]xcessive zeal may be det-
rimental to my client's interests .... " ABA Torts and Insurance Practice Sec-
tion Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism § C(1) (1988) (and numerous state and 
local bar creeds modeled after the ABA model) (on file with author). "For us, 
the idea that civility and candor stand in the way of desired results in fact in-
consistent with the achievement oflong term goals, including successful results 
for our clients." Los Angeles County Bar Association Litigation Guidelines 
pmbl. (1989) (on file with author). 
184. See, e.g., Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (1989) 
(stating that "abusive tactics" are harmful to clients). 
185. For a discussion of the pragmatic rationale of lawyers' uncivil conduct, 
see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. 
186. Killer Cross: A Look at New Techniques of Cross Examination and Im-
peachment in Criminal Cases, Conference sponsored by ABA Section on Crimi-
nal Justice (April3-5, 1992) (brochure on file with author). 
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A moral rationale underlying such a rule, however, forces atten-
tion in the rule's application on the larger policy implications of the 
conduct to which the rule is proposed to apply. Such a rule applies 
to conduct in a way that furthers the "good" that is meant to result 
from compliance, forcing consideration of the more appropriate ma-
terial: when the reason for delay or obfuscation is to offset an unjust 
imbalance of power, when it is to avoid greater moral harm than the 
tactic will cause, when, as Freedman argues, for example, a truthful 
witness's credibility is being attacked because that is the only path 
to a just result/87 a creed provision should and would yield to this 
greater good. The "good" that would be the rationale cannot be 
based upon the "business-as-usual" ethic of the nineteenth century 
organized bar, but on another more closely related to the state of the 
profession today and the values of the society within which it exists. 
ill. THE CURRENT CROP OF CREEDS ARE ILL-CONCEIVED 
AND WILL FAIL 
If creeds can be appropriately confined to aspirational topics, 188 
remain unenforceable, 189 and can be written to reflect the new 
rather than the old common moral ground of the profession, 190 they 
will be valuable. Unfortunately, the current crop of creeds are not 
confined to appropriate topics, have not effectively avoided merging 
into enforceable standards, and are based on an outdated, common 
moral ground. 
A. The Creeds Should Confine Themselves to Appropriate Topics 
for Aspiration 
The current creeds contain a mixture of statements that simply 
restate the current enforceable law governing lawyers, statements 
that contradict or confuse the current enforceable law governing 
lawyers, and statements that aspire to unenforceable but morally 
sound ends. Only the last of these three should be included in a 
creed. 
Some of the provisions of the new creeds are mere restatements 
of the current law governing lawyers. For example, some creeds in-
clude provisions like these from the Seventh Circuit's Standards: 
"In civil actions, we will stipulate to relevant matters if they are 
undisputed and if no good faith advocacy basis exists for not stipu-
187. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal De-
fense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75 
(1966). 
188. For a discussion of creeds as aspirations, see infra Part III.A. 
189. For a discussion of why creeds should remain unenforceable, see infra 
Partiii.A. 
190. For a discussion of rewriting creeds for the present time, see infra Part 
III.C. 
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lating";191 "We will base our discovery objections on a good faith be-
lief in their merit and will not object solely for the purpose of with-
holding or delaying the disclosure of relevant information."192 These 
do no good and some harm by diminishing the clarity of the enforce-
able norms that they paraphrase and by diminishing the force of the 
enforceable norms by commingling the enforceable with the aspira-
tional nature of the creed's main focus. No good, save that of public 
relations, comes from requiring a lawyer to promise to do what the 
law already requires. 
Mandatory rules and aspirational expressions have an impor-
tant relationship to one another. Some mandatory ethics rules im-
plicate lawyer duties that aim unswervingly in one direction, while 
others are an attempted balance among competing duties and goals, 
all of which are appropriate duties and goals but none of which ex-
ists nor can be furthered in isolation from others. Only the former 
are appropriate subjects for so-called "higher standards and aspira-
tion." For example, "protect and do not misappropriate client 
funds,"193 or "charge reasonable fees,"194 or "be diligent and compe-
tent"195 are all statements of mandatory lawyer rules that primarily 
implicate a single duty. For such duties, aspiration is appropriate, 
simple, and uncontroversial: for example, "Be extra careful with cli-
ent funds," "be clear in communicating fee information to clients," 
and "prepare thoroughly and diligently" work well as aspirational 
statements that encourage a·bit more than the rules require with-
out burdening other competing duties. By contrast, most lawyer du-
ties and rules represent a balance among competing legitimate du-
ties. For example, revealing client fraud or prospective criminal 
conduct implicates a balance between the duty to the public and the 
duty to protect client confidences. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and the various state-adopted counterparts, 
seek to locate a place where one duty should yield to the other. 
When a so-called higher standard toward which a lawyer is urged to 
aspire is imposed on such a rule, the balance is moved in one direc-
tion or the other. For such rules, aspiration beyond a solemn com-
mitment to balance carefully the competing interests is aspiration 
191. SEVENTH CmCUIT STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 'JI 9 (1997). 
Query: Under Dondi, would it be uncivil to file a motion for sanctions against a 
lawyer who would not so stipulate? For a discussion of Dondi, see supra notes 
145-54 and accompanying text. 
192. SEVENTH CmcUIT STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 'JI 9 (1997). 
These are rough paraphrases of Rules 3.1 and 3.4(d) of the MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILITY (1995). 
193. A paraphrase of Rule 1.15 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIDILITY. 
194. A paraphrase of Rule 1.5 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIDILITY. 
195. A paraphrase of Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIDILITY. 
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toward one competing duty and away from another competing one. 
As a result, such an exhortation in a creed is not a call for the fa-
miliar "higher standard than the minimum imposed by the rules";196 
rather, it is a call for a different balance of competing duties than is 
currently mandated by the governing, enforceable rule. Even in-
creased civility to fellow lawyers implicates a diminished zeal for 
clients and public service duties. 
The Dondi197 case is a prime example. When the defendants 
failed to timely file their brief, the rule of procedure allowed the 
plaintiff's lawyers to move the court for sanctions.198 When the 
plaintiff did so, the court threatened the plaintiff with sanctions for 
failing to accommodate the defendant's counsel, essentially impli-
cating a Rule 11-like safe harbor provision on the ground that it 
would be more civil for plaintiff's lawyer to have asked defendants 
about their intentions before filing the permitted motion with the 
court.199 All the plaintiff did in Dondi was what the law permitted. 
Even in the good old days, which the creeds seem intent on recre-
ating, a client was permitted to insist that the lawyer take advan-
tage of procedural defaults of an opposing party.200 Imposing an as-
pirational goal as a mandatory rule that strikes a balance between 
competing duties can only alter the balance and create conflicting 
standards of conduct that cannot both be satisfied by a lawyer. 
Once venturing into these areas rather than the noncontrover-
sial, single aim aspirations, a creed is outside its realm and is des-
tined to fail by further confusing and muddling already-difficult 
balance striking. Such an aspiration should rather be addressed to 
efforts to amend the governing rule, if that aspiration identifies a 
wiser, better balance. For example, the Professionalism Blueprint 
encourages as aspiration an emphasis on the lawyer's role as officer 
ofthe court.201 Such encouragement, iffound in a creed, necessarily 
implicates a diminished zeal for the client. "Where the two conflict, 
the duty to the system of justice must transcend the duty to the cli-
ent."202 What of the balances struck by the mandatory rules? Are 
they simply to melt away in favor of a more accommodating nature 
to opposing counsel or the court? 
B. The Creeds Seek a Happily Lost Past 
This move from creed to code in the ABA models is in part a re-
flection of the slowly diminishing stratification of the profession. As 
196. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 265. 
197. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 
284 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 
198. See id. at 285-86. 
199. Id. at 291-92. 
200. See WARVELLE, supra note 18, § 310, at 197. 
201. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 264. 
202. Id. at 280. 
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the organized bar has lost full control over admission to the prac-
tice, it has recognized in its models that the former moral under-
standing-the "take care of one another before all other interests" 
understanding that naturally results from the sort of in-breeding 
that once dominated the profession-must be replaced. Up until 
now, the profession has replaced the former moral common ground 
with rules, a code, that is not aspirational as were the Canons,203 to 
some extent the Model Code,204 and as are the creeds. An attempted 
re-invigoration of the former understanding will fail because that 
former moral understanding no longer prevails in the pluralist bar. 
The former moral understanding cannot be divided away from its 
sources. Too great a part of the former moral understanding was a 
devotion to one's segment of the profession before the client and be-
fore public service, easy enough for those lawyers who were mem-
bers of a club that would not compete with one another for clients 
and who had no need of regularly attracting new clients through 
other than social means. The former moral common ground was to 
too great an extent wedded to the exclusivity of those who formed 
and announced it. It exists as no more than memories of a golden 
age, not unlike every other golden age: it is meant to pass and be 
left behind when social advancements make it irrelevant to current 
affairs. Only creeds that reflect a new moral understanding that is 
based not on in-breeding, but on openness in law school admissions, 
increasing openness in job placement, a pluralist profession, and ac-
ceptance of a variety of models of the "good lawyer," will find the 
support of the new practitioner. 
The profession that operated under the former moral under-
standing was one in which civility existed but was delivered only 
within one's own practice cohort. In particular, outsiders of a wide 
variety were the recipients not of civility but of scorn, ridicule, 
abuse, and exclusion. The story of the organized bar's discrimina-
tion against women, African Americans, particular political groups, 
and religious and geographic ethnic groups is well known by now,205 
and I will summarize only a bit of it here. The point here, however, 
is that the lost form of civility from that earlier age is too closely as-
sociated with the bar's serious sins, and was not given to all. That 
form should not be sought. It was a form that encouraged taking 
care of one's own socioeconomic/practice cohort, to the exclusion 
from the practice cohort if not the practice itself those regarded as 
unworthy because of their skin color, gender, religion, or ethnicity. 
This is a form of civility that is no longer supported by the profes-
sion and therefore must be abandoned as a model for creed and as-
piration once and for all. 
203. See id. at 257. 
204. See id. at 258. 
205. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 7 (describing the bar's history of 
discrimination); WARREN, supra note 31, at 303-10. 
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From colonial times, outsiders were treated by more established 
fellow lawyers not with civility but with scorn and exclusion. The 
early Massachusetts bar, rabidly federalist, ostracized the handful 
of anti-federalist lawyers who attempted to practice in the state.206 
One target of the New York federalist's exclusion fought back. 
Thomas Addis Emmet, hated because he was Irish and because his 
brother was an Irish patriot, ascertained the league formed to ex-
clude him and "he did not wait for an attack. He proved the assail-
ant. Whenever he met any of the league at the Bar, he assumed the 
attitude of professional war, and he lost nothing by contact."207 
On the nineteenth century western frontier, older lawyers took 
whatever advantage of younger lawyers that their experience would 
allow. The older lawyers kept their experience "as a close monop-
oly," forcing younger lawyers to "run a gauntlet of technicalities" at 
a "considerable tuition fee to be paid by [the young lawyers'] cli-
ents."208 
In the early 1900s, the stratification in the bar developed be-
tween what Auerbach calls the -aristocrat lawyer-who represented 
business-and the country lawyer-who represented individuals 
and principles.209 Although the aristocrat and country lawyers had 
differing education, wealth, and power, they shared a common cul-
ture, a common past. This common moral ground was the founda-
tion for yet another stratification between these two groups of es-
tablished lawyers and lawyers entering the profession as a result of 
increased immigration, urbanization, and industrialization.210 
In the twentieth century, the American Bar became stratified, 
largely based on differences in race, color, sex, class, religion, educa-
tion, educational opportunities, and social origins.211 Around the 
turn of the century, law professors and corporate lawyers-the legal 
"elite"-who dominated major professional institutions and associa-
tions, asserted their influence to define professional interests. 
A paramount objective of this elite was to structure the legal 
profession-its education, admissions, ethics, discipline, and 
services-to serve certain political preferences at a time when 
social change threatened the status and values of the groups to 
which elite lawyers belonged and whose interests they wished 
to protect. 212 
206. See WARREN, supra note 31, at 306. 
207. ld. at 303 (quoting CHARLES G. HAINEs, MEMom OF THOMAS ADDISON 
EMMET (1829)). 
208. JOSEPH G. BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TIMES OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI: A 
SERIES OF SKETCHES (1854), reprinted in NoLAN, supra note 156, at 113-15. 
209. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 14-20. 
210. See id. at 19-20. 
211. See id. at 4. 
212. Id. 
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This struggle created a tension between elitism and democratiza-
tion in the legal profession.213 
With the proliferation of this new and undesirable "outsider" 
class of attorneys, the legal "insiders" -the established lawyers-
attempted to preserve traditional values, primarily in corporate law 
firms. 
According to folklore, the doors of access to the legal profession 
always swung open to anyone stung by ambition; lawyers 
might prefer a restricted guild, but democratic realties re-
quired them to settle for less. But this is a half-truth, which 
conceals the fact that doors to particular legal careers required 
keys that were distributed according to race, religion, sex, and 
thni •t 214 e c1 y. 
In fact, what the profession settled for was much less. 
The power, prestige, and money flowing from corporate law 
firms increased the desirability of work there. Yet barriers to non-
traditional applicants were growing as well.215 At the turn of the 
century, some law schools had admission restrictions based upon 
race, sex, ethnicity, class, and family background.216 When law 
firms began to develop a close relationship with law schools, the 
elite corporate law firms had the most advantageous access to the 
"best" law students at the "best" law schools.217 The recruitment 
system channeled the legal talent to corporate firms which provided 
services to a restricted clientele.218 
The impetus behind the 1908 Canons was in large measure a 
subterfuge for class and ethnic hostility. Protestant lawyers, dis-
proportionately represented in the ABA, deemed unethical some of 
the behavior of Jewish and Catholic new-immigrant solo lawyers of 
lower-class origin.219 Ethical deviance was "less an attribute of an 
act than a judgment by one group of lawyers about the inferiority of 
another. "220 
The elite lawyers' influence was not limited to national associa-
tions like the ABA. State and local bar associations, faced with 
rapid social change as well, also defended stability, order, and con-
trol.221 These bar associations often confined membership, as 
Simeon Baldwin, a major force in founding of the ABA, said, "to 
leading men or those of high promise."222 One method oflimiting ac-
213. See id. at 5-6. 
214. Id. at 22. 
215. See id. at 25. 
216. See id. at 29-30. 
217. See id. at 28-30. 
218. See id. at 39. 
219. See id. at 50. 
220. Id. 
221. See id. at 64. 
222. Id. at 63. 
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cess was to charge high fees and expect convention attendance and 
participation in comm.ittees.223 As the associations spoke more and 
more loudly on behalf of the entire profession, the profession's offi-
cial view became that of the exclusive membership of the associa-
tions. 
In 1922, William D. Guthrie, then-president of the New York 
State Bar Association, opposed compulsory bar association member-
ship. Such bar integration, he said, would democratize the bar at 
the expense of "the elite of the Bar, the best of the Bar."224 
"[l]mmigrants and their progeny," Guthrie stated, were responsible 
for "the difficult and grave problem and menace ... arising from the 
admission to our bar in recent years oflarge numbers of undesirable 
members. "225 
Another New York example is even more illuminating: 
In 1929, after a lengthy, publicized investigation in New York 
into the evils of ambulance chasing, resulting in recommenda-
tions of disciplinary proceedings against seventy-four lawyers, 
the chief counsel pointedly observed that some attorneys who 
had testified 'could not speak the King's English correctly .... 
These men by character, by background, by environment, by 
education were unfitted to be lawyers.' The only remedy, he 
suggested, was a character examination, prior to law-school 
admission, to eliminate those who lacked proper antecedents, 
home environment, education, and social contacts. If such an 
examination created a legal aristocracy, he told applauding 
members of the New York State Bar Association, so be it.226 
Efforts to exclude outsiders at the time were not limited to New 
York. In Pennsylvania, a member of a special 1925 committee ap-
pointed to recommend appropriate changes in the state's bar admis-
sion requirements succinctly stated his view about democratization 
of the bar: "What concerns us ... is not keeping straight those who 
are already members of the Bar, but keeping out of the profession 
those whom we do not want."227 Raising educational requirements 
could be goblematic, because "if we do that we keep our own possi-
bly out." Pennsylvania adopted the preceptor system that re-
quired a prospective member of the bar to obtain the assistance of a 
current member as a sponsor in order to gain admission, with the 
obvious effect of limiting the admission of outsiders.229 Speaking at 
223. Seeid. 
224. Id. at 121. 
225. Id. at 121-22. 
226. Id. at 48-49. 
227. Id. at 125. 
228. Id. 
229. See generally Barry J. London, et al., Comment, Admission to the Penn-
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a bar function in Virginia, the Vice President of the United States, a 
member of the Indiana Bar, remarked that "we have permitted to 
drag their green trunks across and along the planks at Ellis Island 
thousands and hundreds of thousands of anarchists, revolutionists, 
... fellows who propose to take charge of this republic of ours."230 
The ABA was, of course, also guilty of blatant efforts at exclu-
sions. When the ABA in 1912 realized that it had admitted three 
African-American lawyers to membership, the ABA passed a resolu-
tion revoking the admission. As the ABA reports state, since the 
"settled practice of the Association has been to elect only white men 
as members," and since the committee was "in ignorance of material 
facts" such as the applicants' race, the matter was referred to the 
entire association for consideration.231 The ABA, after receiving 
pressure, readmitted the three lawyers but required all future ap-
plicants to identify themselves by race.232 
One way the elite tried to exclude outsiders was through its at-
tempt to set higher educational standards and higher bar admission 
standards. The elite lawyers were troubled by the influx of immi-
grants and Jews into the legal profession-many of whom went to 
law school by night or via correspondence courses. Night schools, 
observed the Dean of the Wisconsin law school, enrolled "a very 
large portion of foreign names. "233 An ABA committee recommended 
that the character of the bar could be improved by raising educa-
tional standards in order to "purify the stream at the source."234 
Easy access to the bar was also a problem for the elite, who 
blamed easy access for the bar's inferior quality, which was blamed 
for the denial of justice to the poor.235 The obvious "remedy" was to 
restrict access to the bar.236 That urban immigrants, declared 
George W. Wickersham, Attorney General to President Taft and 
senior partner in a prestigious New York law firm, "with their im-
perfect conception of our institutions, should have an influence upon 
the development of our constitution, and upon the growth of Ameri-
can institutions, is something that I shudder when I think of."237 
Eastern European immigrants were described by one lawyer as pos-
sessing little fairness, justice, and honor; the result, he continued, 
would threaten the Anglo-Saxon law of the land.238 
preceptor approach to admission. Blueprint, supra note 2, at 272 
(recommending modified Pennsylvania preceptor approach). 
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A significant measure of the exclusion effort was directed to-
ward Jews, who were disproportionately concentrated at the top of 
their classes in law school but were also disproportionately concen-
trated at the bottom of the metropolitan bar.239 Law firm prejudice 
against hiring Jews was justified by placing the blame on the preju-
dice of the firms' clients.240 Even law professors who helped to find 
students employment recognized and often participated in prejudice 
against Jewish students-from identifying students as Jews to 
listing Jewishness as a handicap.241 
[W]ith some conspicuous exceptions to the contrary, Jewish 
law review editors were excluded from partnerships in the 
prestigious corporate law firms until after World War II; 
blacks and women were outsiders until their token entry in the 
late 1960's and early 1970's; and [by the mid 1970's] ethnic 
minority group members ha[d] barely begun to gain entry. 
Consequently, Protestant partners in these firms comprised 
the professional elite; comprising it, they defined it; defining it, 
they excluded non-whites, non-males, and non-Christians. 
Academic achievement was necessary, but insufficient, for en-
try. Social origins, together with racial, sexual, and ethnic 
identity, determined both the possibility of academic achieve-
ment and the opportunity to reap its rewards.242 
Although the organized bar's efforts at exclusion retarded the 
entry of outsiders into the profession, the eventual democratization 
and diversification of the profession have remade the profession into 
a diverse, pluralistic entity that would be hardly recognizable to 
Hoffman, Sharswood, Baldwin, Drinker, Root, and the drafters of 
the 1908 Canons.243 If the law is what the lawyers are, and the law-
yers are what the law schools make them, then a profession is what 
its members are, and its moral common ground is that of its mem-
bers. Backward looking aspiration will fail. 
C. Searching for the New Moral Common Ground 
To be effective, aspiration must be unenforceable and must be 
based on the common moral ground of the aspirants. A nonenforce-
able norm or aspirational statement does not use formalized pres-
sure; to be effective, it must utilize implicit pressure to encourage 
239. See id. at 184. 
240. See id. at 186. 
241. Seeid. 
242. Id. at 29-30. 
243. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251-52; ABA Section of Legal Educ. and 
Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and Professional Development-An 
Educational Continuum, 11-27 (1992) (commonly known as the Macerate Re-
port); Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 
WASH. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (1994); RICHARD L . .ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS tbls. 
26-30 (1989). 
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compliance. The lawyer must feel motivated to conform to the aspi-
ration's message either by his or her own conscience or by the social 
pressure exerted by his or her fellow professionals. 
Such implicit pressure usually takes, and ought to take, the 
form of moral consensus,244 and is uniquely appropriate when the 
matter under consideration is an aspirational ideal. The more well-
tailored a creed is to existing professional standards, the more im-
plicit pressure will be exerted on the individual lawyer. A creed 
may never be able to exhort the truly "bad lawyer" to abide by its 
dictates, but insofar as it guides and provides motivation for the 
rest of the legal community, a moral rather than pragmatic founda-
tion is a necessity. And in any event, the enforceable norms will 
come from code not creed. 
There has been a change in the moral common ground in the 
profession, not all of which is for the worse. Much of this change is 
the result ofthe inability of the bar to control entry and confine it as 
it once did to the very whitest males.245 Where will the new moral 
common ground lie? There is as yet no certain answer; there are 
only signs pointing in particular directions. To be sure, to have 
value, creeds must confine themselves to aspiration; and aspiration 
is effectively a non-mandatory statement of the ideal. There are, as 
well, models of the ideal that are being proposed.246 For example, 
Kronman suggests a refreshing of the lawyer-statesman idealt7 
Luban might favor the "moral activist lawyer" as the ideal;248 
Freedman proposes an ideal of a more client favoring lawyer who 
relies heavily on role morality and whose primary moral decision 
occurs when he or she agrees to represent a particular client.249 
Our new profession has existed for only twenty or so years, 
hardly long enough to have expressed a change in moral common 
ground in a manner that will stick and be dominant for the foresee-
able future. It took some time when the business lawyer emerged 
as the dominant form in the late nineteenth, early twentieth cen-
tury for the changes to be made clear, but clear they were. The plu-
ralist profession we now have may have to accept that there is no 
single model of the "good lawyer," unless it is that the good lawyer is 
the lawyer who is accepting of multiple models of good lawyering. 
Perhaps that will emerge as the common moral ground, acceptance 
of multiple models ofwhat makes good lawyering rather than insis-
244. See CAHN, supra note 102, at 47-48 (describing how moral consensus 
provides for pressure to conform absent legal sanctions). 
245. See Blueprint, supra note 2, at 251-52 (describing the increasing diver-
sity of the American Bar). 
246. See, e.g., Atkinson supra note 119, at 303-20 (identifying three models 
of the good lawyer and identifying the one favored by the current creeds). 
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248. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxii (1988). 
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tence on a single model that represents a description of the current 
professional elite. 
If Kronman is right and the former "Lost Lawyer"' ideals can be 
refreshed,250 they must be done so in a way that will permit them to 
function in a modern, diverse profession. The diversity should pro-
duce good for the profession. Kronman says the ideal of practical 
wisdom is gone.251 Perhaps he is right, perhaps not. The practical 
wisdom of searching for a satisfying middle ground on which to base 
decisions and moral consensus remains:252 it is this middle ground 
that has moved. The middle has moved because there is a more 
widely divergent range of views about what the profession is and 
ought to be represented by those who are of the profession. The 
wider range of views and experiences oflife now form the full land-
scape of the profession's membership; and unlike past times, some 
of the leadership and power in the profession comes from those who 
hold a broader view of the profession's mission. The new search is 
for a new middle, a new middle informed by the new trends in 
scholarship,253 new diversity at the bar, and new leaders who have 
not agreed to refrain from competing with one another in favor of 
joint competition with other, less powerful segments of the bar. 
One manifestation of change that may foretell where the new 
common moral ground will be found can be seen in the change in le-
gal education, and particularly in legal scholarship; changes in legal 
education have before been associated with changes in the profes-
sion's moral common ground.254 In 1992, the Michigan Law Review 
published an article by Judge Harry T. Edwards255 that was to mark 
a significant moment in the changing character of legal scholarship. 
Judge Edwards' article criticized in sharp tones the change he per-
ceived in legal scholarship from the practical, the doctrinal, to the 
impractical, antidoctrinal.256 The response was so overwhelming 
and mixed that the Michigan Law Review devoted an issue to the 
responses of some nineteen commentators.257 Included in that issue 
was an update by Judge Edwards in which he detailed the 
"extraordinary" reaction to his article, demonstrating the "deep and 
250. KRoNMAN, supra note 121, at 4. 
251. Id. at 2-3. 
252. See id. at 3-5. 
253. See id. at 242-67 (the new scholarship is a move away from the lawyer 
ideal of practical wisdom). 
254. See id. at 154 (describing the relationship between the adoption of the 
Harvard method, and for that matter the university-ization of legal education 
and the change in the profession of the late nineteenth, early twentieth cen-
tury). 
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and the Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
256. Id. at 34-42. 
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widespread concern" about the issues he had raised.258 Judge Ed-
wards and the responders, I believe, describe a phenomenon associ-
ated with a change in the profession's common moral ground. 
Among the critics of Judge Edwards' article were Richard Posner259 
and Derrick Bell.260 Judge Posner had "deep disagreements" with 
"Judge Edwards's double barreled blast at legal education and the 
practice of law";261 Professor Bell "vigorously challenged some of 
Judge Edwards's assumptions."262 Posner and Bell had not hereto-
fore produced scholarship fitting neatly between 'Land M'; rather, 
they represented widely divergent views on a variety of topics. 
Nonetheless, they joined together in decrying Judge Edwards' de-
mand for a narrower range of acceptable scholarship. Sanford 
Levinson implicitly, and accurately, explained the phenomenon of 
agreement between Bell and Posner by his criticism of Judge Ed-
wards's failure to account for "pluralism in the legal academy."263 
Broader views of acceptable scholarship are in part a result of 
the legal academy's-and the profession's-move toward demo-
graphic consistency with the general population. This development 
changes the moral common ground of the profession to make it more 
reflective of American cultural diversity. A profession's values are 
those of its members, especially those of its members with power. 
The early twentieth century leaders of the profession knew this 
well, and endeavored to keep the profession's membership "pristine" 
in a wide variety ofways.264 The new profession, barely a generation 
old, has begun to exert its influence on the profession's moral 
ground. One way in which that influence is observable is by exami-
nation of the breadth of current legal scholarship. While it may be 
more theoretical than Judge Edwards would like, it is undoubtedly 
considerate of a wider variety of perspectives on American life than 
has been true until the recent past. 
Until relatively recent times, legal scholarship was within a 
range from "L toM," rather than from "A to Z." It was largely doc-
trinal, meant to influence in a direct way the development of legal 
doctrine by influencing courts and legislatures. Lawyers could 
make immediate, direct use of law review articles in the crafting of 
their arguments. Recently, a considerable portion of legal scholar-
ship has turned away from the doctrinal toward the critical and 
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other genres. Some debate has surrounded the value of such schol-
arship,265 but an evaluation of its merit is not my focus.266 It is, un-
deniably, one result of the organized bar's failure to control entry 
into the profession and eventually the professorate. That such 
writing is being done is the direct result of the greater diversity of 
the profession. 
The organized bar's values are not the values that are inform-
ing this scholarly vein. But these new values and the scholarship 
they support and inform have begun and will continue to find their 
way into the practice in the form of new ways of looking at legal 
problems. From economic perspectives to race and gender perspec-
tives, the best of these ideas will change the way the law and the 
profession work. They will affect the moral understanding of the 
profession. 
The broader acceptable range of what constitutes the good 
scholar may foretell a broader acceptable range of what constitutes 
the good lawyer. There, perhaps, the new common moral ground 
will lie, forming the basis for a new set of aspirations for the profes-
sion. 
CONCLUSION 
Aspiration is a good thing when it is unenforceable, when it is 
confined to topics that are not complicated balances of competing in-
terests, and when it is based on a moral rationale that fairly repre-
sents the common moral ground of the aspirants. The current wave 
ofprofessionalism creeds fail on all three counts. Valuable aspira-
tion can be pursued. Its basis must be a new common moral 
ground, one that accepts and honors a wider range of acceptable 
models of the good lawyer. 
265. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of 
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